WHAT IS CLAIMED IS:

1. An apparatus for executing a secure program in a computer system, wherein the ability to make workable copies of the secure program from the computer system is inhibited, the apparatus comprising:

a program memory in which the secure program data is stored in an encrypted form;

a security chip coupled to the program memory, the security chip comprising:

means for decrypting portions of the secure program into a clear portion and a remainder portion;

means for providing the clear portion to memory locations accessible by a processor; and

remainder memory for storing the remainder portion of the secure program, the remainder memory not directly accessible by the processor;

means for requesting subsets of the remainder portion for use by the processor; and

means, within the security chip, for checking that the requested subset is a *predetermined* subset ~~expected to be requested given a~~ *dependent on the* stored state for the processor.

2. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the secure program stored in the program memory is stored with the program portion and the remainder portion stored separately.

3. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the remainder portion is a set of branch instructions of the secure program.

4. The apparatus of claim 3, wherein the security chip further includes means for caching branch statements based on recently executed branches.

5. The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the means for decrypting branches is configured with a decryption key.

1         6. The apparatus of claim 5, wherein the decryption key is stored in

2    volatile memory.

1         7. The apparatus of claim 6, wherein the volatile memory is distributed

2    over the security chip, the security chip further comprising overlying circuitry which

3    overlies and obscures at least a part of the volatile memory.

1         8. The apparatus of claim 7, wherein the overlying circuitry is coupled to

2    a power source for the volatile memory such that the removal of the overly circuitry

3    removes the power to the overlying circuitry.

1         9. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a clocking means, within

2    the security chip, for determining a rate of instruction execution of the processor,

3    wherein the security chip responds to processor requests only when the clocking means

4    determines that the rate is within an expected range.

1         10. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a data decompressor for

2    decompressing the secure program after decryption, wherein the secure program is

3    compressed before encryption.

1         11. The apparatus of claim 10, wherein the decompressor is an entropy

2    decoder.

1         12. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a checksum means,

2    within the security chip, for determining a checksum of bus accesses on a processor bus,

3    wherein the security chip responds to processor requests only when the determined

4    checksum matches an expected checksum.

1         13. The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising a data scrambler for

2    reordering data elements of the secure program according to a reversible and

3    deterministic pattern determined by a key value, wherein the secure program is reordered

4    by the inverse of the data scrambler before being placed in the program memory.

1          14.  The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the data scrambler comprises a

2  plurality of first-in, first-out buffers.

1          15.  The apparatus of claim 13, wherein the reversible and deterministic

2  pattern is generated by reference to the output of a pseudorandom number generator.

1          16.  The apparatus of claim 1, wherein the means for decrypting operates

2  based on the key value and the output of a pseudorandom number generator.

1          17.   The apparatus of claim 1, further comprising means for altering the

2  operation of the security chip and the flow of the program when said means for checking

3  detects that an unexpected subset has been requested, where by the altered operation

4  causes a negative effect on the program flow or operation.

1          18.   The apparatus of claim 17, wherein the means for altering is a

2  means for halting the processor.

1          19.   An apparatus for ~~securing~~ encrypting program data ~~from~~ to prevent unauthorized

2  copying, comprising;

3          a branch separator for extracting branch statements from the program data;

4          a compressor for compressing the extracted branch statements and a

5  remainder of the program data to form compressed data; and

6          an encryptor for encrypting the compressed data.

1          20.   The apparatus of claim 19, wherein the branch separator comprises:

2          means for automatically generating checksum data representing checksums

3  of program data; and

4          means for automatically generating timing information used to assess

5  timing of program data processing,

6          whereby the checksum data and the timing information are compressed by

7  the compressor and encrypted by the encryptor.

1          21. A method of executing a secure program to prevent copying of the

2  secure program in a usable form from information acquired over an insecure processor

3  bus, comprising the steps of:

4          accepting a request from the insecure processor for a block of program

5  data, the block of program data including at least one of one or more program

6  instructions or one or more program data elements;

7          decrypting, in a secure manner, the block of program data into a clear

8  portion and a remainder portion;

9          providing the clear portion to the insecure processor; and

10        accepting requests from the insecure processor for elements of the

11  remainder portion;

12        checking that the request is proper given the state of the insecure processor

13  and previous requests;

14        processing the requests from the insecure processor for elements of the

15  remainder portion; and

16        responding to the requests, wherein underlying remainder portion elements

17  are not feasibly determined by reference to only the information content of a response to

18  a request.

1          22. The method of claim 21, further comprising the steps of:

2          separating a program into the clear portion and the remainder portion to

3  form a secure program; and

4         encrypting the secure program prior to placing the secure program in a

5  memory accessible by attackers intent on making unauthorized copies of the secure

6  program.

1          23. The method of claim 22, wherein the step of separating is a step of

2  separating branch instructions of the secure program from other instructions of the secure

3  program.

1          24. The method of claim 21, wherein the step of decrypting is performed

2  with a decryption key.

25. The method of claim 24, further comprising the step of storing the
2 decryption key in volatile memory.

1      26. The method of claim 25, further comprising the steps of:
2      providing a power source to the volatile memory;
3      covering the volatile memory with a circuit such that the power source is
4 removed from the volatile memory when the circuit is disturbed and the contents of the
5 volatile memory cannot be easily measured without removing the circuit.

1      27. The method of claim 21, further comprising the step of checking a
2 rate of instruction execution of the processor prior to providing a response to a request
3 for information.

1      28. The method of claim 21, further comprising the step of
2 decompressing the secure program after decryption, wherein the secure program is
3 compressed before encryption.

1      29. The method of claim 21, further comprising the steps of:
2      determining a checksum of bus accesses on a processor bus;
3      comparing the checksum to a precalculated checksum expected for the
4 instructions of the secure program which were expected to be executed; and
5      preventing the unobstructed operation of the secure program when the
6 checksum and the precalculated checksum differ.

1      30. The method of claim 21, further comprising a steps of:
2      scrambling an order of data elements of the secure program according to a
3 reversible and deterministic pattern determined by a key value prior to storage in a
4 memory accessible by attackers; and
5      descrambling the order of the data elements upon proper request of the
6 processor.

1        31.  The method of claim 30, wherein the step of scrambling comprises a

2  step of generating a pseudorandom number used to form the reversible and deterministic

3  pattern.

1        32.    A method for securing a program against unauthorized copying,

2  comprising the steps of:

3        separating program code according to sequences of nonbranch instructions

4  and branch instructions;

5        compressing the non-branch instructions to form a first set of compressed

6  data;

7        compressing the branch instructions to form a second set of compressed

8  data; and

9        encrypting the first and second sets of compressed data.